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INTRODUCTION 
Many believe the foreclosure crisis is over, but this is far from the case, especially 
for minority neighborhoods. Even after federal loss mitigation programs became more 
effective, minorities faced greater obstacles qualifying for loss mitigation options. 
Mediation programs were then adopted as a leveling mechanism. These programs were 
designed to address servicing abuses and reduce the devastation to minority 
neighborhoods. While foreclosure mediation programs are still in their infancy, early 
quantitative and qualitative assessments suggest them to be a promising option to reduce 
foreclosures and the resultant blight in minority neighborhoods. 
 
I. MORTGAGE ORIGINATION AND SURGE OF SUBPRIME LENDING 
 Minority communities have experienced rapidly changing relationships with 
financial institutions. Historically, many minority communities have lacked access to 
capital. Before the 1980s, lenders avoided inner-city neighborhoods largely due to fear, 
prejudice, and institutional discrimination.1 Lenders were more likely to deny African 
American borrowers loans, especially in white neighborhoods, whereas whites were more 
often denied in minority neighborhoods.2  
 After decades of marginalization, minority communities were granted access to the 
mortgage lending process as a revenue source for mortgage originators. As investor 
appetite for highly rated mortgage-backed securities increased, mortgage originators 
viewed minority borrowers differently: they became a profit source and a market to be 
targeted. Soon after the loans were entered into, the mortgage originators sold their loans 
                                                          
1  Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 
629, 631 (2010). 
2  Id. 
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to investment banks that were often willing to pay premiums for lucrative subprime loan 
revenue streams. The investment banks then securitized the loans and passed the risk on 
to institutional investors.3  
 Previously excluded from the mortgage market, many minority borrowers took the 
deals being offered. Subprime loans provide borrowers with poor credit an opportunity to 
obtain a mortgage but with much higher fees and interest rates. The additional costs are 
justified based on the increased risk and typically higher foreclosure rates. These fees and 
interest rates helped fuel the expansion of the subprime lending market after 1994.4 
“Simultaneously, subprime lenders expanded their mortgage product, offering to include 
more [adjustable rate mortgages,] . . . interest-only loans5 [,] . . . and payment option loans6 
. . . , which previously were only available in select markets.” 7 
 While subprime loans allowed lenders to extend credit to those who might not 
otherwise qualify, such loans were often exploitative in nature and provided in a 
discriminatory manner. Predatory subprime lenders seeking heightened fees flooded into 
these markets and targeted minority neighborhoods. Even when taking into account 
income and neighborhood characteristics, African Americans were 64% more likely to 
receive a subprime loan than their white counterparts,8 and this holds true for Asians and 
Hispanics as well.9 Mortgage originations for home purchase in high-credit-risk 
neighborhoods significantly increased after 2000, doubling by 2004.10 “High-cost loans 
were much more prevalent [in minority neighborhoods] than elsewhere: 61% of home 
purchases in weak-market neighborhoods closed with a high-cost loan between 2004 and 
2006, a rate almost double that of other neighborhoods.”11 
 A number of studies have evaluated low-income neighborhoods in the Chicago area 
to better understand this phenomenon. A study of Austin, a low-income neighborhood on 
Chicago’s West Side, found that the neighborhood was the largest single mortgage market 
by application volume within Chicago.12 Increased access to capital led to increased median 
sale prices to as low as 12% to 15% to as high as 30% to 60% in other low-income 
                                                          
3  Id. For a description of this securitization process, see Cathy Hwang & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Value of 
Uncertainty, 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 19 (2015). 
4  Jeff Crump, Kathe Newman, Eric S. Belsky, Phil Ashton, David H. Kaplan, Daniel J. Hammel & Elvin Wyly, Cities 
Destroyed (Again) For Cash: Forum on the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis, 29 URB. GEOGRAPHY 745, 759 (2008) (citing Philip 
Ashton, An Appetite for Yield: The Anatomy of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 41 ENV’T & PLAN. A. 1420, 1429 (2009)). 
5  Borrower pay interest or a percentage of the interest for a set period of time such as 5 or 10 years. 
6  Borrowers can choose their monthly payment. 
7  Crump et al., supra note 4, at 752. 
8  Id. at 767 (citing Jeff Crump, Subprime Lending and Foreclosure in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties: An Empirical 
Analysis, 35 CURA REP. 14 (2005)). 
9  Id. 
10  Id. at 761 (citing Philip Ashton, & Matthew Doyle, Weak Market Neighborhoods in Chicago: A Baseline Study, U. ILL. 
CHI. CITY DESIGN CTR. (2008)). 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
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neighborhoods between 2001 and 2005.13 “This created incentives to refinance and drew all 
homeowners into a pattern of speculative market development.”14  
 What is even more alarming is many minority borrowers with subprime mortgages 
may have been eligible for a less-costly mortgage. A study commissioned by the Wall Street 
Journal analyzed credit scores in 2006 and determined 60% of borrowers in a subprime 
mortgage may have qualified for a prime loan, which is significantly higher than Freddie 
Mac’s estimates of 15%.15 Beth Jacobson, one of Wells Fargo’s top producing subprime loan 
officers, admits, along with other loan officers, that African Americans in Baltimore were 
systematically singled out for high-interest subprime mortgages even though they could 
have qualified for prime loans.16 Wells Fargo even created an emerging-markets unit to 
target African American churches that could influence congregants to take out subprime 
loans.17 The City of Baltimore is now suing Wells Fargo and has released data showing “that 
more than half the properties subject to foreclosure on a Wells Fargo loan from 2005 to 
2008 now stand vacant. And 71% of those are in predominantly [African American] 
neighborhoods.”18 
  Predatory lenders targeted similar neighborhoods nationwide. Another study of 
two of the poorest neighborhoods in Chicago, Englewood and Garfield, found these 
neighborhoods “experienced phenomenal growth of 55% in mortgage credit for home 
purchases from 2002 to 2005, when growth was only 27% for the rest of Chicago” despite 
the average incomes of the neighborhood being half that of the rest of the city and the 
majority of residents having a credit score below 660.19 A review of the income reported for 
these two neighborhoods during this same time period shows a decline in real income.20 
After further examining similarly situated neighborhoods, the researchers concluded that 
the expansion of subprime mortgage lending was driven by an expansion in credit supply 
that was unrelated to improvements in borrower income.21 
 The impact extends well beyond new homebuyers. As subprime lenders increased 
their marketing to minority neighborhoods, established homeowners began refinancing at 
                                                          
13 Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. at 777. 
16  See Michael Powell, Bank Accused of Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2009) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/us/07baltimore.html?_r=0. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, Fraudulent Income Overstatement on Mortgage Applications during the Credit Expansion of 
2002 to 2005 at 1-37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20947, 2015), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20947.pdf. 
20  Id. at 1. 
21  Id. at 1–2. 
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low introductory or teaser rates.22 One California study of subprime borrowers found 
African Americans were significantly more likely than whites (40% vs. 24%) to report 
lender-marketing efforts as the impetus for taking out a home equity line of credit.23 African 
Americans may have responded to these marketing efforts because of a misplaced belief 
that the lenders recommending transactions were giving advice in their best interest.24 
 
II. FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
 In 2008, the foreclosure crisis began. Yet its causes and subsequent impact remains 
speculative due to the lack of accurate, consistent data on foreclosures. State-specific 
variability in foreclosure processes makes the data less uniform and frustrates efforts to 
draw conclusions.25 For example, it may also be difficult to determine exactly what “counts” 
as a foreclosure. “Foreclosure” is defined in a variety of ways, ranging from mortgage default 
to the sheriff’s sale. Such disparate definitions are particularly problematic, as not all 
foreclosures proceed under the same processes. Without federal regulation requiring 
nationwide data-gathering, much of the work on racial disparities in lending and 
foreclosure relies heavily on data reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) or the proprietary RealtyTrac, which does not make metadata available.26 
 Despite the limited available data, much has been written on the causes of the crisis, 
including increased market liquidity, unprepared/naïve/ambitious borrowers, 
securitization of mortgages reducing originator risks, little federal regulation, declining 
property values, interest rate resets, aggressive marketing, poor underwriting, fraud, high 
demand for securities, and the list goes on. Others blame the crisis on the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977, which provides low-cost mortgages for borrowers in low-income 
neighborhoods. However, this theory has largely been debunked. There is also the bubble 
theory, that the foreclosure crisis occurred because of distorted beliefs rather than distorted 
incentives, such that “securitization merely facilitated transactions that borrowers and 
investors wanted to undertake anyway.”27  
  Regardless of the ultimate underlying cause or combination of causes, the 
foreclosure crisis has widespread and undeniable impact. “By the beginning of 2011, lenders 
                                                          
22  An introductory rate (also known as a teaser rate) is an interest rate charged to a customer initially but it is not 
permanent and after it expires a higher than normal rate will apply. 
23  Mian & Sufi, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
24  Many Americans mistakenly believe that financial intermediaries provide advice consistent with their clients’ best 
interests. For research in the securities context, see Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented 
Regulation of Investment Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 101, 104 (2014) 
(explaining that “retail customers simply expect that advice given will be in their best interest”)). 
25  Crump et al., supra note 4, at 775. 
26  See Id. 
27  Christopher L. Foote, Kristohper S. Gerardi, & Paul S. Willen, Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad 
Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis 1–61 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18082, 2012), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18082.pdf. 
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had completed foreclosures of 2.7 million homes with mortgages taken out during the 
subprime boom years from 2004 to 2008 . . . [such that by] the fall of 2011, nearly four 
million homes were either in foreclosure or had mortgages that were seriously in default.”28  
 
III. DEFAULT RATES HIGHER IN MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS 
  The foreclosure crisis hit minority, low-income neighborhoods particularly hard 
with default rates in these neighborhoods spiking sharply higher than in predominantly 
white neighborhoods.29 One study of Metropolitan Chicago illustrates what occurred 
nationwide: “Just 16 out of Chicago’s 77 community areas accounted for 42% of all 
foreclosure filings citywide between 2000 and 2007.”30 These neighborhoods experienced 
foreclosure rates three to four times higher than in other neighborhoods with as many as 
one in three properties entering the foreclosure process.31 These same neighborhoods had 
previously maintained stable owner-occupancy conditions through the 1970s and 1980s, 
which was the result of government-insured loan programs or with the assistance of small 
community banks.32 However, the housing market boom in the 1990s passed over these 
neighborhoods, which negatively impacted home values.33 Minority neighborhoods were 
then targeted by subprime lenders and funneled into high-cost mortgages. Then, as interest 
rates rose and housing prices further declined, “homeowners with unmanageable 
mortgages lost the capacity to get out of trouble by refinancing or selling their homes.”34 
Because many of these borrowers funded home purchases with subprime mortgages, they 
found themselves unassisted in the first wave of defaults and foreclosures.35 The highest 
delinquency rates were among Latino and African American homeowners as shown in 
the chart below. 
  
                                                          
28  Geoff Walsh, Rebuilding America: How States Can Save Millions of Homes Through Foreclosure Mediation, NAT’L 
CONSUMER L. CTR. (2012). 
29  See Crump et al., supra note 4, at 756. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. at 760. 
32  Id.  
33  Id. at 760–61. 
34  Id. at 755. 
35  See id. at 771. 
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Figure 1 
60+ Days Delinquent by Race/Ethnicity and Date36 
 
 
 A more recent study outlined in the table below shows “substantial variation across 
racial/ethnic types in foreclosure levels, with all-white neighborhoods having an average 
rate of 2.3%, but mostly-African American and mostly-Hispanic neighborhoods having 
rates about three times as high (8.1 and 6.2%, respectively).”37 
 
Table 1 
Foreclosure Levels in 2005 to 2009, by Neighborhood Racial/Ethnic Structure in 200038 
 
                                                          
36  J. Michael Collins & Carolina Reid, Who Receives a Mortgage Modification? Race and Income Differentials in Loan 
Workouts 25 (Fed. Res. Bank S.F., Working Paper No. 2010-07, 2012), http://www.frbsf.org/community-
development/files/who-receives-mortgage-modification.pdf.  
37  Matthew Hall, Kyle Crowder, & Amy Spring, Neighborhood Foreclosures, Racial/Ethnic Transitions, and Residential 
Divisions, 80 AM. SOC. REV 526, 534 (2015). 
38  Id.  
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IV. LOAN MODIFICATION POLICIES 
 The initial attempts to address the foreclosure crisis were largely unsuccessful and 
focused upon refinancing, voluntary loan modifications, or counseling.39 Many of the 
modifications made during 2007 and 2008 actually increased borrowers’ monthly mortgage 
payment. 40 
 Not surprisingly, the modifications completed in 2007 and 2008 quickly caused a 
high rate of re-default, only worsening the crisis.41 “Over half the loans modified during 
2008 were in serious default within a year of modification. By the beginning of 2010, barely 
one-quarter of the loans modified in 2008 were current.”42  
 Policy approaches then shifted to reducing the borrowers’ monthly mortgage 
payment, but the initial reductions in the payments were not sufficient “with only 39 
percent of all modifications resulting in a monthly payment decrease of 10 percent or more 
by the fourth quarter of 2008.”43  
  In early 2009, the Treasury launched the Making Home Affordable Program (MHA), 
which allocated $75 billion to support loan modification efforts, with a goal of reaching 9 
million distressed borrowers by December 2012.44 MHA offered the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) loan modification as well as relinquishment options, such 
as a deed in lieu or short sale.45 HAMP loan modifications capitalize the arrears, lower 
interest rates, extend loan terms, and forebear a portion of the balance at 0% interest 
and/or a principal reduction. This waterfall analysis requires servicers to follow each step 
until the loan meets an affordability threshold for the borrower in which the borrower’s 
mortgage payment, including taxes and insurance, is less than 31% of the borrower’s gross 
monthly income. A loan modification includes a Net Present Value (NPV) test—an 
assessment of whether or not it is more cost effective to offer a loan modification or 
foreclose. Once a modification is approved, there is an initial trial period plan in which the 
borrower must demonstrate capacity to maintain the modified terms by making three 
                                                          
39  These programs included FHA Secure, refinancing program; Hope Now Alliance: counseling and voluntary loan 
modifications; National Foreclosure Mitigation Program: counseling; HOPE for Homeowners: foreclosure 
prevention, primarily through initiatives to refinance loans through the Federal Housing Administration. 
40  Walsh, supra note 28, at 4. 
41  U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, COMPARING THE PERFORMANCE OF HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM (HAMP) 
MODIFICATIONS AND NON-HAMP MODIFICATIONS: EARLY RESULTS 2 (2014) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, EARLY 
RESULTS], http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Documents/HAMP 
 %20vs%20non-HAMP%20Performance%20Study%2002-27-2015%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
42  Walsh, supra note 28, at 4. 
43  U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, EARLY RESULTS, supra note 41, at 2. 
44  Collins & Reid, supra note 36, at 3, 10. 
45  The relinquishment options later became known as the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program (HAFA) 
pursuant to Making Home Affordable’s Supplemental Directive 09-09. Making Home Affordable, Home Affordable 
Foreclosure Alternatives—Short Sale and Deed-in-Lieu of Foreclosure Update, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION 
PROGRAM 1 (2010), https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hafa/sd0909r.pdf. 
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months of timely payments. After this time period, the temporary plan is to convert to a 
permanent loan modification.46  
 In 2009 and early 2010, demand for loan modifications was high, and servicers were 
ill-equipped to handle the applications.47 “In an effort to provide assistance to struggling 
homeowners as soon as possible, servicers were not required to verify a homeowner’s 
income prior to commencing a trial modification.”48 With few financial incentives for 
servicers, limited risk of sanctions for servicer non-compliance, and no private right of 
enforcement, borrowers struggled to obtain modifications.49  
 Loan modification programs have not been as successful as many had hoped. In 
October 2009, trial plan approvals peaked at approximately 160,000 approved for that 
month, but approvals steadily declined to only 31,000 in the month of April 2010.50 
“Conversions of trial plans to permanent HAMP modifications reached their highest level 
in April 2010” with the approval of 70,000 permanent modifications.51 At this same point in 
time, 699,357 trial plans failed to convert to a permanent loan modification.52 Servicers 
claim the failure to convert was because income verification was not provided after the trial 
modification commenced.53 But, according to the National Consumer Law Center, 
“[h]undreds of thousands of borrowers whose trial plans were approved during the fall of 
2009 simply had their plans canceled during the spring of 2010.”54 Without meaningful 
regulatory oversight and data reporting, the accuracy of these claims remains unclear. 
 To be sure, conversion ratios have increased somewhat. In June 2010 the MHA 
program started to require income documentation prior to a trial modification approval, 
and since that time 91,108 trial modifications have been canceled.55 The numbers of new, 
permanent loan modifications also fell sharply to between 25,000 to 30,000 permanent 
modifications monthly, between April 2010 and September 2010, and this low monthly 
approval rate continued through 2011.56 In October 2011, 3.9 million loans were at least 
                                                          
46  Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_5.pdf (last updated Jan. 6, 
2016). 
47  U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 
2014, 5–7 (2014) [hereinafter MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE FOURTH QUARTER 2014], http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/f 
 Inancial-stability/reports/Documents/4Q14%20Quarterly%20MHA%20Report%20Final3.pdf.  
48  Id. at 5.  
49  Clay S. Hester, Airing Out HAMP’s Dirty Laundry: Resolving Corvello, Wigod, and the Inherent Problems of the Home 
Affordable Modification Program’s Trial Period Plans, 93 N.C. L. Rev. Addendum 39, 42 (2014). 
50  Walsh, supra note 28, at 14. 
51  Id. 
52  See id. 
53  See id. 
54  Id. 
55  The data does not specify why the cancelations occurred, which leads to the question: if income has been verified, 
why are trial modifications being canceled? See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE FOURTH QUARTER 2014, supra note 47, at 5. 
56  Walsh, supra note 28, at 14. 
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ninety days delinquent or in foreclosure.57 The monthly permanent loan modification rates 
remained fairly steady in 2013 with an average of 22,678 and in 2014 with an average of 
20,584 per month.58 The first quarter of 2015 shows a decrease to 16,299 permanent loan 
modification approvals per month.59  
 
Table 2 
Affordability of Modified Loans (2008–2011) 60  
 
HAMP has not lived up to the Treasury’s stated objectives. When the Treasury 
announced HAMP, it predicted 3 to 4 million households would receive reduced mortgage 
payments by the time the program was to end in December 2012.61 HAMP was to become 
the industry standard for sustainable affordable home modifications. Instead, by December 
2012, only a little over 1.2 million first lien HAMP permanent loan modifications had been 
                                                          
57  LPS Mortgage Monitor: November 2011 Mortgage Performance Observations, BLACK KNIGHT FINANCIAL SERV. 3 (Oct. 
2011), http://www.bkfs.com/CorporateInformation/NewsRoom/MortgageMonitor/201110MortgageMonitor/LPSMor 
 tgageMonitorOctober2011.pdf.  
58  See quarterly and monthly program performance reports in U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: 
PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH DECEMBER 2013 at 11 (2014), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Pages/Making-Home-Affordable-Program-Performance-
Report.aspxDocuments/December%202013%20MHA%20Report%20Final.pdf; MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE FOURTH 
QUARTER 2014, supra note 47, at 34. 
59  See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH THE FIRST QUARTER 
OF 2015 at 4 (2015) [hereinafter MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE FIRST QUARTER 2015], http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fi 
 nancial-stability/reports/Documents/1Q15_Quarterly_MHA_Report_Final.pdf. 
60  Walsh, supra note 28, at 12. 
61  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Relief for Responsible Homeowners: Treasury Announces Requirements for 
the Making Home Affordable Program (Mar. 4, 2009) http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/200934145912322.aspx.  
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approved,62 leaving millions of homeowners who met basic eligibility requirements and 
tried to obtain a HAMP modification instead being denied.63 MHA including HAMP was 
set to expire in 2012 but remains in effect, with revised directives and program changes, 
with the hope of achieving its initial goals. As of the end of the first quarter of 2015, only 
around 1.8 million first lien HAMP permanent loan modifications had been approved.64 
The application deadline for MHA programs has been extended to December 31, 2016.65 
 Furthermore, more non-HAMP modifications have been offered than HAMP 
modifications over an extended period of time. According to the U.S. Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision’s (OTS) 
quarterly surveys, “lenders modified 233,853 mortgages during the third quarter of 2010, of 
which 58,790 were HAMP modifications.”66 This means that in 2010, only 25% of the 
modifications were HAMP modifications. “For the third quarter of 2011, the total number 
of permanent loan modifications dropped by 96,314 with only 40% being HAMP 
modifications.”67 The chart below shows permanent loan modifications from April 2009 to 
April 2013 and illustrates the prevalence of private modifications.  
 
  
                                                          
62  This number reflects MHA first lien modifications that were started. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME 
AFFORDABLE: HAMP APPLICATION ACTIVITY BY SERVICER AS OF DECEMBER 2012, (2012) 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/HAMP%20Application%20Activity%20 
 December%202012.pdf.  
63  Walsh, supra note 28, at 5. 
64  MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE FIRST QUARTER 2015, supra note 59, at 4.  
65  U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2015) [hereinafter MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW]. 
66  See Walsh, supra note 28, at 15.  
67  See Id. at 15. 
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Figure 2 
Permanent Loan Modifications Since April 200968 
 
 
 In the fourth quarter of 2013, the percentage of non-HAMP modifications 
skyrocketed to 70%.69 But in 2014, half of the modifications were HAMP and the other half 
were non-HAMP modifications.70 During 2014, non-HAMP modifications decreased by 
52.1%, but HAMP modifications only increased by 8.3%.71  
HAMP’s underutilization has significant consumer protection implications. Now 
“[v]irtually all HAMP modifications reduce the borrower’s monthly principal and interest 
payment, with a median payment reduction of approximately $500, or over a third of the 
median monthly payment before modification.”72 HAMP also offers much more than 
payment reductions for borrowers. It also provides a fixed rate for the first five years, 
prohibits modification fees, waives late fees, and prohibits a waiver of legal rights.73 In 
addition, HAMP now offers borrowers $1,000 in annual principal reductions for up to five 
years of consistent payments and a principal reduction of $5,000 in year six as long as the 
                                                          
68  MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW, supra note 65. 
69  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK 
MORTGAGE LOAN DATA 6 (2014). 
70  First Quarter of 2014, 50% of modifications were proprietary, Second Quarter of 2014, 43% of the modifications were 
proprietary, Third Quarter of 2014, 49% of the modifications were proprietary, and by the Fourth Quarter, 50% of 
the modifications were proprietary. Id. at 53 tbl.56. 
71  Id. at 5. 
72  U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, EARLY RESULTS, supra note 41, at 2.  
73  Hester, supra note 39. 
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loan is in good standing.74 These protections and incentives are significant, whereas the 
proprietary loan modification offers are less standardized and generally have less favorable 
terms. When the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reviewed modification 
performance two years after the start of the review, only 17.4% of those started in 2013 were 
disqualified. HAMP modifications continue to exhibit lower delinquency and re-default 
rates than industry modifications.75 
 
Table 3 
# Months 
Post 
Modification 
% of Disqualified Modifications76 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
(Q1) 
All 
3 2.1 1.7 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.3 
6 6.7 6.7 5.3 4.3 3.8 4.6  5.5 
12 16.3 15.6 12.7 10.3 9.4 10.4  13.2 
18 22.9 22.7 18.9 15.3 14.0   19.6 
24 28.9 28.0 23.7 19.1 17.8   24.9 
30 33.4 32.6 27.3 22.4    29.5 
36 37.6 36.6 30.0 26.0    33.7 
42 41.1 39.3 33.0     37.3 
48 43.6 41.6 36.4     40.9 
54 46.0 43.8      44.1 
60 48.0 47.5      47.6 
 
V. LOAN MODIFICATION POLICY FAILINGS 
 Despite the growing evidence that HAMP modifications are affordable and 
sustainable, borrowers continue to face significant barriers to being approved or are being 
offered less affordable modification options. As enumerated above, the number of HAMP 
permanent loan modifications has been decreasing. Servicers’ reasons for denying 
permanent loan modifications are questionable and not supported by the data. Servicers’ 
most cited reasons for denying borrowers are that borrowers have insufficient 
documentation, that there is a change in NPV analysis, or that the borrower failed to accept 
the modification offer.  
                                                          
74  U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES: 
VERSION 4.5, 137-38 (2015) [hereinafter HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES], https://www.hmpadmin.co 
 m/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_45.pdf.  
75  MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE FIRST QUARTER 2015, supra note 59, at 8.  
76  Id. 
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 On the other hand, consumer advocates cite a process of “calculated chaos” 
including servicers losing documents, failing to follow promised time frames, failing to 
notify homeowners of reasons for servicers’ actions, giving invalid or blatantly false reasons 
for denials, providing ineffective review of decisions, and pursuing foreclosure while 
reviewing for modifications or during active trial modifications.77 In October 2009, a 
congressional oversight panel reported “evidence of eligible borrowers being denied HAMP 
modifications incorrectly, misinterpretations of program guidelines, and difficulties 
encountered by borrowers and housing counselors in understanding the NPV models, as 
well as the reasons that HAMP applications were being denied.”78 
 
A. Insufficient Documentation 
 Insufficient documentation is the most common reason loan servicers give for 
borrower denials and accounts for 20% of all loan modification request denials in 
California.79 However, consumer advocates and housing counselors state the real reason 
behind such denials is that the servicers lost the documents or failed to timely review the 
information which in turn results in unnecessary and redundant requests. If an application 
is not timely reviewed, the application materials become “stale” often requiring the 
borrower to submit new paycheck stubs, bank statements, and utility bills. While the 
borrower is gathering and submitting these documents, the modification request 
documents then become stale, requiring the borrower to start the application anew. This 
often frustrates the borrower to the point of giving up on his or her application entirely. 
Servicers then deny the application, claiming insufficient documents, even though servicer-
driven delays cause the documents to go stale. Indeed, “[m]ost housing counselors report 
that the large loan servicers ‘always’ or ‘almost always’ lose documents.”80   
 The Treasury has made some attempts to address these failings. During 2010 and 
2011, the U.S. Treasury Department made several revisions to the federal guidelines, setting 
time frames for servicers’ decisions and requiring written notices to borrowers.81 
Specifically, servicers were required to review initial application packages for completeness 
                                                          
77  Walsh, supra note 28, at 5. 
78  SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, THE NET PRESENT VALUE TEST’S IMPACT ON HOME 
AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 4 (2012), https://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/NPV_Report.pdf.  
79  Race to the Bottom: An Analysis of HAMP Loan Modification Outcomes by Race and Ethnicity for California, CAL. 
REINVESTMENT COALITION 18 (2011) [hereinafter CAL. REINVESTMENT COALITION], http://calreinvest.org/system/resource 
 s/W1siZiIsIjIwMTEvMDcvMTIvMTFfMTBfMjdfOTg3X0hBTVBfUkVQT1JUX0ZJTkFMLnBkZiJdXQ/HAMP%20REP
ORT%20FINAL.pdf. 
80  Id. at 2. 
81  Walsh, supra note 28, at 14. 
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within thirty days.82 However, the MHA regulations provided no private right of 
enforcement to the borrowers and the problems continued.  
 “On February 9, 2012, the [United States] Attorney General announced that the 
federal government and forty-nine states had reached a settlement agreement with the 
nation’s five largest mortgage servicers to address mortgage servicing, foreclosure, and 
bankruptcy abuses (the ‘National Mortgage Settlement’).”83 The agreement settled state 
and federal investigations into the country’s five largest mortgage servicers and the 
investigations found that servicers routinely signed foreclosure related documents outside 
the presence of a notary public and without really knowing whether the facts they 
contained were correct.84 The settlement established the first ever nationwide reforms to 
servicing standards requiring “single point of contact, adequate staffing levels and training, 
better communication with borrowers, and appropriate standards for executing documents 
in foreclosure cases, ending improper fees, and ending dual-track foreclosures for many 
loans.”85 
 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued regulations, which 
became effective in January 2014 to address the continuing servicing abuses. These 
regulations included requirements related to accessing and providing timely and accurate 
information,86 properly evaluating loss mitigation applications,87 facilitating oversight of 
and ensuring compliance with the rules by service providers,88 facilitating transfer of 
information when servicing is transferred to a different servicer,89 and informing borrowers 
of error resolution and information request procedures.90 Specifically, the CFPB regulations 
require servicers to provide written acknowledgement detailing what additional 
information must be submitted and a reasonable deadline to do so, within five days of the 
servicers’ receipt of an application.91 The CFPB regulations, similar to the HAMP 
regulations, require a decision on the complete application to be made within thirty days 
of receiving all information from the borrower.92 
 
                                                          
82  U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM—PROGRAM UPDATE AND RESOLUTION OF ACTIVE 
TRIAL MODIFICATIONS 3 (2010), https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hafa/sd0909r.pdf. 
83  National Mortgage Settlement, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ust/national-mortgage-settlement (last 
visited August 1, 2015). 
84  About the Settlement, JOINT ST.-FED. NAT’L MORTGAGE SERVICING SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about (last visited on August 1, 2015). 
85  Id.  
86  See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(b)(1)(iv) (2016). 
87  Id. § 1024.38(b)(2). 
88  See id. § 1024.38 (b)(3). 
89  See id. § 1024.38 (b)(4). 
90  See id. § 1024.38 (b)(5). 
91  See id. §§ 1024.41(b)(2)(i)(B), (b)(2)(ii). The application must be received forty-five days prior to the foreclosure sale 
for the timelines to apply. Id. § 1024.41(b)(2)(i). 
92  See id. § 1024.41(c)(1)(i). 
Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality  Volume 4, Issue 2 
 
263 
 
B. Denials Based Upon the NPV Calculation 
 As discussed above, the HAMP eligibility analysis requires servicers to run a NPV 
test to determine whether it is more economical for the investor to modify the loan or 
foreclose on the property.93 Servicers claim negative NPV outcomes to be responsible for a 
sizeable percent of modification denials. “Curiously, a significant share of canceled trial 
modifications with a positive NPV were canceled due to ‘negative NPV,’ suggesting the 
servicer later changed its NPV analysis for some reason (or that there was an error in data 
reporting).”94 The Government Accountability Office reported in June 2010 that “15 of the 
20 largest servicers were not running the NPV test in compliance with HAMP guidelines,” 
and half of the servicers sampled had at least a 20% error rate for income calculations which 
is just one of the NPV factors.95 A 2012 report by the Special Inspector General for the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) found in a sample of 149 HAMP applications, 
“servicers could provide both accurate inputs and documentation for only 2 of the HAMP 
applications.”96 “Based on Treasury data as of March 2012, approximately 5% of 3.2 million 
homeowners denied for HAMP were denied based on the NPV test” and more than 160,000 
HAMP-eligible homeowners have been turned down based on the results of the NPV test.97  
 These reports led to the adoption of Section 1482 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
requires a publicly available web-based NPV calculator to assist borrowers in 
understanding the NPV evaluation process under HAMP and conducting their own 
estimated NPV evaluation.98  
 
C. Failure to Accept a Loan Modification Offer 
 The borrower failing to accept a modification offer is the most perplexing reason for 
modification denials. As discussed above, the application process for a loan modification is 
very time consuming. Even the most straightforward application requires borrowers to 
provide two years of signed and dated tax returns, two current paystubs with year-to-date 
figures, two months of bank statements, current documentation of utility bills and 
expenses, and numerous loss mitigation application forms, such as the Request for 
Modification Assistance form or Uniform Borrower Assistance form, 4506T form or 4506EZ 
form, Dodd Frank Certification, and a hardship letter.99 Depending upon the borrower’s 
circumstances, the borrower might also have to provide a divorce judgment, death 
certificate, quarterly profit and loss statement, signed and dated contribution letter, lease 
agreement, quitclaim deed, current benefit award letters, and the list goes on. It thus seems 
                                                          
93  CAL. REINVESTMENT COALITION, supra note 79, at 20. 
94  Id. 
95  SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 78, at 5.  
96  Id. at 10. 
97  Id. at 1. 
98  See id. at 6. 
99  See HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES, supra note 74, at 81–82, 85, 90–96. 
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improbable that, after all of this effort to achieve a loan modification, a borrower would 
simply turn an offer down. 
 One plausible explanation for the apparent frequency of borrowers turning down 
loan modifications is that these borrowers are offered proprietary modifications with less 
favorable terms than the anticipated HAMP modification. Indeed, “88% of housing 
counselors report that servicers are steering borrowers into generally less favorable non-
HAMP modifications.”100 As discussed above, HAMP typically provides more affordable 
modification rates and principal reduction incentives, which results in an overall lower re-
default rate than proprietary modifications.   
 It may also be that borrowers are actually executing and returning their permanent 
loan modification documents but the servicers are then rejecting the executed documents. 
Several cases have been reported of borrowers’ permanent loan modification documents 
being rejected and payments returned based upon a perceived technical error. For example, 
in one case the offer required both borrowers to sign the modification but only provided 
one place for the signatures to be notarized. One borrower was working temporarily out of 
state, so the borrowers were unable to sign simultaneously before a notary. The borrowers 
each signed the agreement and had their signatures notarized separately as they were 
signed at different times. The servicer rejected the permanent loan modification stating 
that the borrowers must have the same notary acknowledging their signatures on the same 
date. A new agreement was sent to the borrowers who again notarized the new copy of the 
permanent loan modification and sent it to the servicer in the envelope provided by the 
servicer. After doing so, they received a letter rejecting their last two payments and stating 
the case had been referred back to foreclosure. For reasons that remain unclear, the servicer 
was unable to locate the documents. A new offer was then sent out two months after the 
revised one had been submitted, and the new offer still required the borrowers to sign 
simultaneously. The borrowers again submitted the documents with a single notarization 
but shortly thereafter received a letter stating the terms of their modification had been 
revised and they needed to sign the revised modification. The revisions included an 
increase in the principal balance and monthly payment due to the servicer’s delays in 
finalizing the permanent loan modification. It took five months to finalize the modification 
paperwork and for the borrowers to secure a fully executed permanent loan modification.101  
 In another case, the borrower’s signature was rejected because the servicer claimed 
the notary’s signature was illegible. In another instance, the paperwork was rejected 
because the notary failed to include the notary’s middle initial when the middle initial was 
included in the notary’s seal.102 
                                                          
100  CAL. REINVESTMENT COALITION, supra note 79, at 3. 
101  The example case is a case from the Illinois McLean County Foreclosure Mediation Program.  
102  Cases from the Illinois McLean County Foreclosure Mediation Program. 
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 The large discrepancies of reported servicer performance seem to support the 
reasons cited by consumer advocates. By the end of HAMP’s first year, the percentage of 
eligible loans that servicers had actually modified varied significantly, with Ocwen 
converting nearly 18%, CitiMortgage only 9%, and Bank of America, the largest 
participating servicer, had permanently modified only 3%.103 These significant disparities 
led the Treasury, in June 2011, to publish quarterly servicer assessments on three major 
compliance categories and seven quantitative metrics.104 These servicer assessments were 
further enhanced to present new compliance metrics and related benchmarks in the third 
quarter of 2013.105 As of the fourth quarter of 2014, Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase 
Bank were found to need minor improvement, with CitiMortgage, Nationstar, Ocwen Loan 
Servicing, Select Portfolio Servings, and Wells Faro needing moderate improvement.106 
 
D. Racial Disparity in Loan Modifications 
 Racial disparities in loan modifications remain uncertain. J. Michal Collins and C.K. 
Reid studied a sample of subprime loans made in 2005 among borrowers in Oregon, 
California, and Washington,107 and “[did] not find any racial or ethnic differences in who 
receives a loan modification. In fact, African Americans were slightly more likely to receive 
a loan modification than whites.” 108 However, they did not find the same effect for Latinos. 
This finding persists when Collins and Reid controlled for borrower, loan, and other factors 
that might influence loan modification rates. 
 However, the study only looked at permanent loan modifications and was unable to 
determine the number who applied or failed to complete the application process.109 This is 
significant given the loss mitigation process and issues outlined above, particularly for non-
English speaking minority borrowers. “Race or perceived race could serve as a proxy [that] 
servicers use for decision making on modifications, especially if these borrowers are 
deemed less sophisticated, more time consuming and therefore more costly to serve.”110  
  The California Reinvestment Group utilized data from the Treasury Department on 
HAMP loan modification applications and a 2011 survey of fifty-five housing counselors 
working at forty-eight different non-profit agencies.111 Though the HAMP data was limited, 
                                                          
103  See Walsh, supra note 28, at 15 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: SERVICER 
PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH MARCH 2010 at 7 (2010)). 
104  See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE FOURTH QUARTER 2014, supra note 47, at 17. 
105  See id. 
106  Id. at 18. 
107  Collins & Reid, supra note 36, at 18. The study analyzed “a unique dataset that merges data on the loan performance 
of subprime home mortgages that are managed by Corporate Trust Services (CTS) of Wells Fargo Bank with data on 
borrowers reported as part of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Id. at 2. 
108  Id. at 11. 
109  See id. at 12. 
110  Id. at 5. 
111  See CAL. REINVESTMENT COALITION, supra note 79, at 1. Loan modification activity through November 31, 2010. Id. at 8. 
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the study found disparities in the experiences of borrowers along racial and ethnic lines.112 
The housing counselors felt overall that loan modification outcomes were poor, but “42% 
of housing counselors reported that borrowers of color [were] receiving worse outcomes 
than white borrowers.”113 Though there are disparities in the factors leading up to 
foreclosure such as unemployment, predatory lending, and lower equity, the modification 
data itself seems to support the housing counselors’ perspective.  
 Rationales for trial cancelations differ across racial groups. In Fresno, 47% of trial 
cancelations for Latinos and 44% for African Americans were due to “incomplete requests,” 
compared to 37% for white borrowers.114 The same pattern was found in Los Angeles and 
San Francisco/Oakland, whereas in Sacramento 41% of Asian borrowers were denied for 
“incomplete requests.”115 
 African Americans in Los Angeles and Sacramento had the highest share of borrower 
non-acceptance: 5.2% (Los Angeles) and 7.2% (Sacramento) of all African American trial 
modification cancelations, compared to 3.9% and 5.1% for white borrowers. In Fresno, 
Asian borrowers had the highest share, representing 7.5% of Asian borrower cancelations 
and in San Francisco/Oakland, Latinos had the highest share at 5.8% of trial modification 
cancelations.116 Trial modification plans for Latinos and Asians were also disproportionately 
canceled for failing the NPV test with 34% for Latinos and 28% for Asians, compared to 
22% and 23% for African Americans and whites, respectively.117 
 Further, the California Reinvest Coalition found that 
 
White borrowers had a noticeably larger share of loan modifications that more 
dramatically reduced the amount of income needed to cover mortgage payments. 
Approximately 45% of white borrowers receiving official modifications had a change in 
front-end [debt to income ratio] of more than 20%, whereas only 33% of Asian borrowers, 
32% of Latino borrowers and 37% of African American borrowers saw similar decreases in 
mortgage debt burdens after active loan modifications.118  
 
 Whereas, J. Michael Collins and C.K. Reid’s earlier study found there were no 
disparities in the types of the loan modifications received.119 This seems to indicate a need 
to further evaluate the affordability components of a loan modification, which is a more 
individualized assessment of the borrowers’ debt-to-income ratio than simply comparing 
loan modification terms themselves.  
                                                          
112  See id. at 2. 
113  Id. at 3. 
114  Id. at 2. 
115  Id. at 19. 
116  See id. 
117  Id. at 20. 
118  Id.  
119  Collins & Reid, supra note 36, at 1. 
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VI. ROLE OF FORECLOSURE MEDIATION  
 Mediation has been proposed as a means to address servicing abuses. The 2012 
SIGTARP report found the number of servicer errors with the NPV test and failure to 
comply with HAMP guidelines raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the 
Treasury’s oversight of servicers.120 Borrowers cannot enforce the regulations because MHA 
does not provide a private right of action. Only recently, under the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau regulations, borrowers obtained the right to enforce the loss mitigation 
rules in 12 C.F.R. 1024.41 under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,121 which provides 
for damages, costs and attorney’s fees. Though, these rules provide only general servicing 
guidelines, not a private right of action under any specific loss mitigation program 
guidelines.122 Foreclosure mediation programs can provide for the necessary additional 
oversight and enforcement of the regulations by monitoring the document exchange, 
evaluating basis for denials, and acceptance of the permanent loan modification.123  
 Many states have created mediation programs to reduce burdens on their justice 
systems, finding that the parties can resolve such issues efficiently without litigation. By 
2014, there were fifteen statewide programs and 158 programs serving limited jurisdictions 
such as cities, counties, or judicial districts.124 On April 25, 2013, Illinois Attorney General 
Lisa Madigan awarded $5 million in grants from the national foreclosure settlement to fund 
the creation and implementation of new mortgage foreclosure mediation programs.125 As 
of the end of 2014, six new foreclosure mediation programs had been implemented in 
Illinois with two additional programs seeking approval from the Administrative Office of 
the Illinois Courts. The six newly implemented mediation programs vary in their structure 
and resources provided.126 Each program reports information into a statewide database 
maintained by Resolution Systems Institute to better quantify the impact of foreclosure 
mediation programs and how program design may influence loss mitigation outcomes. 
                                                          
120  See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 78, at 18. 
121  12 U.S.C. 2605(f) (2012). 
122  See id.; 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a) (2016). 
123  U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Sarmiento, 121 A.D.3d 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). 
124  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF MASS., FINAL REPORT OF THE FORECLOSURE IMPACTS TASK FORCE 15 (2014), 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/initiatives/addressing-the-foreclosure-crisis/foreclosure-impacts-task 
 -force/final-fitf-report.pdf. 
125  Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Madigan Announces $5 Million Grant For Foreclusure Mediation Programs 
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2013_04/20130425.html. The Illinois Attorney 
General, in conjunction with other state attorney generals, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S, Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, secured a national settlement in 2012 with five of the nation’s largest servicers. 
See Bank Foreclosure Settlement Overview, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. ST. ILL., http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumer 
 s/settlementpdfs/Bank_Foreclosure_Settlement_Overview.pdf (last visited on August 1, 2015).  
126  Jennifer Shack, Six Programs, Six Models: An Evaluation of the Foreclosure Mediation Programs Funded by the Office 
of the Illinois Attorney General, RES. SYS. INST. 19 (2015), http://www.aboutrsi.org/pfimages/SixProgramsSixModels.pdf 
 ?pdf=Six-Programs-Evaluation.  
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This data enhances the statewide data collected by the Administrative Office of the Illinois 
Courts. 
 Though mediation programs vary from county to county and state to state, the 
purpose of the various mediation programs remains unified. As stated by Attorney General 
Madigan, “[t]he goal of a foreclosure mediation program is to connect homeowners in crisis 
with legal assistance and housing counseling services so they can accurately assess their 
options and pursue the best plan.”127 Madigan further propounded, “[b]ecause mediation 
has been proven to give homeowners a greater chance to save their homes, these grant 
funds will help both families and communities that have been devastated by the foreclosure 
crisis.”128 The mediation programs also provide additional oversight through the loss 
mitigation process. Many of the mediation programs establish protocols for the exchange 
of documents, require that servicers adhere to time frames for making decisions, ensure 
that homeowners receive accurate notice of decisions, have an effective recourse for review 
of those decisions, and prevent servicers from moving ahead to a foreclosure sale until the 
review process has ended.129 Borrowers are then given an opportunity to meet with their 
servicer to further discuss their options and the decisions made upon their loss mitigation 
applications. These mediation program rules largely parallel or supplement the MHA and 
CFPB guidelines. 
 A 2012 study of recently implemented mandatory foreclosure mediation programs 
in Florida provided empirical evidence that mandatory mediation increased the probability 
of lenders modifying the mortgage.130 The study analyzed loans in three metropolitan 
statistical areas before and after a mandatory mediation program was adopted. The study 
was also able to compare loans in the same statistical area in which one sub-part had 
adopted a program and the other sub-part had not. The study found that “mandated 
mediation appears to boost modifications, in some cases significantly.”131  
 A final benefit of the foreclosure mediation process is that the borrowers are given 
advice as to their options, which may, in the long term, provide better loan modification 
performance. As of March 2014, more than 28% of HAMP modifications had been 
disqualified because the borrower missed three consecutive monthly payments on the 
modified loan.132 Six years into the Connecticut mediation program the data showed only 
approximately 10% of homeowners reentering the program, with many of those 
                                                          
127  Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Madigan Announces $5 Million Grant For Foreclusure Mediation Programs 
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2013_04/20130425.html. 
128  Id.  
129  See Walsh, supra note 28, at 6. 
130  J. Michael Collins & Carly Urban, Mandatory Mediation Laws and the Renegotiation of Mortgage Contracts, 125 ECON. 
J. 1734, 1735–36 (2015). 
131  Id. at 1755. 
132  U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, EARLY RESULTS, supra note 41 at 3. 
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homeowners continuing an ongoing case, “which means that program reentry rates are 
fairly low and that positive effects for homeowners appear to be sustainable over time.”133  
 
A. General Foreclosure Mediation Outcomes 
 Unfortunately, many programs do not maintain or track the same statistics. But 
what is reported shows that mediation does seem to reduce foreclosure. Connecticut has a 
high success rate with 82% of cases mediated resulting in an agreement.134 In the District 
of Columbia, 72.5% of the mediations resulted in a loan modification, reinstatement, or 
graceful exit.135 Delaware’s statewide program reports 60.66% of homeowners either 
achieved a non-foreclosure resolution or are still actively engage in mediation.136 In Maine, 
since its launch in 2009 through February 2014, “60% of cases mediated in 2010 and 59% of 
cases mediated in 2011 have been dismissed. Of cases mediated in 2013, 21% have been 
dismissed so far.”137 “Dismissal” means that the case is ended, and no foreclosure occurs. In 
Cook County, Illinois, the mediation programs have a “steady 51% rate of success in 
reaching agreements with banks through the mediation process.”138 Ohio’s limited 
jurisdictions range from 61% to 32% of mediations ending in agreement.139 On the lower 
end, agreement rates are 41% for Maryland, 33% Pennsylvania, and 31% for Nevada. 
Florida’s statewide program has the lowest success rate with 25% of mediations resulting 
in an agreement though the foreclosure mediation program within bankruptcy has 35% of 
cases reaching an agreement.140 
 Mediation has also delivered improved results. In Connecticut a review of the 31,000 
foreclosure cases between 2008 and 2014, found that, of the cases completed in the 
mediation program only 32% ended in foreclosure and out of the 68% that avoided 
foreclosure, 72% of the homeowners retained their home with 85% of those borrowers 
receiving a loan modification.141 These results were obtained even though the program 
primarily services low and middle-income borrowers.142 In Connecticut, borrowers who 
                                                          
133  Gloria Jean Gong & Carl Brinton, Connecticut Judicial Branch Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program Evaluation, 
ST. JUST. INST. 33 (Oct. 2014), http://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/FMP/sji_eval.pdf. 
134  Id. at 20. 
135  Foreclosure Mediation Program Statistics: May 25, 2011 - May 9, 2013, D.C. DEP’T INS., SEC., & BANKING (MAY 9, 2013),  
 http://disb.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/disb/publication/attachments/MediationStatisticsasofMay92013.pdf. 
136  Letter from Matthew F. Lintner, Del. Att’y Gen., to Hon. Jan R. Jurden, Hon. Patricia M. Belvins & Hon. Peter C. 
Schwartzkopf (May 27, 2015), http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/fraud/cpu/documents/mediation/2015/Q1_2015_ 
 Letter.pdf. 
137  STATE OF ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PROGRAM, REPORT TO THE JOINT STANDING COMM. ON INS. AND FIN. 
AFFAIRS AND THE JOINT STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 126th Legislature, at 1 (2014). 
138  ILL. CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CNTY., CHANCERY DIVISION MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT, 
at 13 (Jun. 27, 2012). 
139  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF MASS., supra note 124, at 23. 
140  Id. at 21. 
141  Gong & Brinton, supra note 133, at 24. 
142  Id. at 4. 
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chose to participate in mediation avoided foreclosure at a rate 13% higher than borrowers 
who chose not to participate in mediation.143 
 Foreclosure mediation in Washington, D.C. also showed a high success rate with 
homeowners retaining their property in 78% of the mediations and 4% arranging a graceful 
exit.144 In Philadelphia, a five-year study showed there were about 2,400 successful loan 
resolutions145 and “85% of homeowners who reached an agreement remained in their 
homes after one year.”146 However, Maine reports that only 21% of mediations resulted in 
agreement.147  
 The value of the mediated agreements can be significant not only for the borrowers 
but also for the communities themselves. Over one year, at the University of Illinois College 
of Law Community Preservation Clinic in McLean County, the Illinois foreclosure 
mediation program helped borrowers and the community to save sixty-two homes through 
a loan modification or other retention options.148 The Clinic was able to arrange a graceful 
exit such as a short sale or deed in lieu in twenty-one cases allowing clients to transition 
into alternative housing, rebuild their credit faster, and in some instances secure relocation 
assistance. These agreements resulted in principal reductions in the amount of $65,010.20, 
secured $51,105.59 in Hardest Hits Funds, reduced interest rates in loan modifications and 
refinancing by 91.117% points, reduced the monthly payment amount by $7,034.70, waived 
$454,264 in deficiency in short sale transactions with $4,000 in relocation assistance, and 
waived $30,526.81 in deficiency through consent judgments. The total value of homes saved 
was $7,490,405.149  
 
B. Opt in vs. Opt Out 
 The impact of the foreclosure mediation program is significantly influenced by the 
way in which borrowers enter in the program. In many situations, opt-out regimes improve 
participation rates. For example, behavioral economists have found that in voluntary 
retirement plans, automatic enrollment can increase participation significantly. In one 
study, opt-in participation rates were barely 20% after three months of employment, 
gradually increasing to 65% after three years of employment compared to the opt-out 
                                                          
143  Id. 
144  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF MASS., supra note 124, at 20. 
145  Michael McKeever, Pennsylvania Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion Program Benefits Servicers, HOUSINGWIRE (Dec. 12, 
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participation rates of new employees, which began at 90% and increased to more than 98% 
within three years.150 
 Opt-out programs may be a particularly important choice for architectures when 
early non-participation creates a substantial penalty. In the retirement context, early non-
participation causes the saver to forgo years of potential interest. In the foreclosure context, 
early loss mitigation matters a great deal because a borrower’s options decrease as the 
arrearage increases. “Thirteen of the statewide programs use an opt-in method for enrolling 
borrowers, and two use an opt-out method.”151 In the limited jurisdiction programs, thirty-
nine of the programs are opt-in and twenty-nine are opt-out.152 
 The recent analysis of the six new programs adopted in Illinois further demonstrates 
this pattern in the foreclosure mediation setting. The opt-out programs in the Sixth and 
Twenty-First Circuits each helped more than 60% of homeowners, whereas the other 
circuits with opt-in programs had 7 to 25% of eligible homeowners entering the program.153 
The opt-out programs have a one-step entry into the program whereas the opt-in programs 
often have multi-steps to participate, such as completing a detailed financial questionnaire 
or attending an informational session and calling a housing counseling agency.154 
 Other opt-in programs show similar results. Data on Maine’s program, which is an 
opt-in program, shows the participation rate “was 30% of foreclosure cases filed in 2010. 
The rate rose to 43% in 2012, but fell to 36% in 2013.”155 Delaware’s statewide automatic 
foreclosure mediation program seems to have the highest participation rate of 53.66%.156  
 One particular concern with opt-in programs is when the servicers are required to 
send notice of the mediation. When Hawaii first launched its Third Circuit Foreclosure 
Mediation Pilot Program it found that in nearly 50% of the cases the servicer failed to attach 
the notice.157  
 Other foreclosure mediation opt-out programs continue to demonstrate higher 
levels of participation rates. “A [five-year] study of the Philadelphia diversion program 
                                                          
150  See Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, The Behavioral Economics of Retirement Savings Behavior, AARP 2 (2007),  
 http://www.retirementmadesimpler.org/Library/The%20Behavioral%20Economics%20of%20Retirement%20Savin
gs%20Behavior%20-%20Full.pdf.  
151  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF MASS., supra note 124, at 15. 
152 “Ohio’s 88 counties, all of which have adopted foreclosure mediation, have the option of selecting an opt-in or opt-
out enrollment model. At the time of researching this issue, a specific breakdown of which counties have adopted 
opt-in and opt-out enrollment was not available.” OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF MASS., supra note 124, at 15. 
153  See Shack, supra note 126, at 20. 
154  See id. 
155  STATE OF ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PROGRAM, supra note 137, at 2. 
156  See Letter from Matthew F. Lintner, supra note 136. 
157  See Memorandum from Comm. on Initiatives to Enhance Civil Justice & Hawaii Access to Justice Comm’n to Chief 
Justice Mark E. Recktenwald, Supreme Court of Hawaii 5 (Dec. 22, 2010) http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/news_an 
 d_reports_docs/foreclosure_access_to_justice_response.pdf. 
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found that 70% of homeowners appeared for the mandatory conferences and were assigned 
free housing counselors.”158 
 Indiana, however, best demonstrates the value of the opt-out program model. When 
Indiana first adopted foreclosure mediation in 2009 it was an opt-in program in which 
servicer attorneys sent the notices to borrowers. The initial participation rates were less 
than 5%.159 When courts began mailing the notices and included a date and time for 
mediation, the participation rates rose to 50%.160 
 
C. Borrower Resources: Legal Assistance and Housing Counselors 
 Foreclosure mediation programs have the potential to address the common failings 
of the loss mitigation process. One issue is the power and information disparity between 
participants. Borrowers often come into the process feeling helpless with no idea what their 
options are. Notably, the borrowers are not repeat players and often do not understand the 
system. Foreclosure mediation programs address this by providing resources to guide 
borrowers through the loss mitigation application process. These resources include HUD 
certified housing counselors who are sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) to provide free foreclosure prevention counseling.161 
Foreclosure mediation programs also often provide access to legal representation. For 
example, as part of the national foreclosure settlement, Illinois Attorney General Lisa 
Madigan distributed $20 million for legal aid services for homeowners and renters in 
distress and $70 million for housing counseling and community redevelopment projects.162 
One consideration for these grant applications was the provision of resources within 
foreclosure mediation programs. In Illinois’ Twentieth Judicial Circuit of St. Clair County, 
homeowners who received assistance from a housing counselor or a legal services attorney 
were more likely to avoid foreclosure than those who did not, as detailed in the chart 
below.163 
 
  
                                                          
158  McKeever, supra note 145. 
159  Alan White, State Foreclosure Mediation Laws: Examples and Research for a Uniform Statute, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION 
3 (May 11, 2012), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mortgage%20foreclosure/4_2012may11_RREMFFP_State% 
 20Foreclosure%20Mediation%20Laws%20memo_White.pdf. 
160  Id. 
161  HUD Office of Counseling HUD Approved Housing Counseling Agencies, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcc/hcs.cfm (last visited May 10, 2016). For free counseling see Shack, supra 
note 126, regarding the provision of HUD certified counselors specifically within IL. 
162  See Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Madigan Announces $5 Million Grant For Foreclusure Mediation 
Programs (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2013_04/20130425.html. 
163  Shack, supra note 126, at 176. 
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Table 4 
Outcomes by Service Received164 
 
Retention Relinquishment 
No 
Agreement 
Program Not 
Completed 
Housing 
Counseling 
8 38.1% 3 14.3% 6 28.6% 4 19.0% 
Land of Lincoln 12 57.1% 1 4.8% 7 33.3% 1 4.8% 
Neither 8 29.6% 0 0% 11 40.7% 8 29.6% 
 
D. Legal Representation 
Evaluating just the impact of legal representation is difficult given the wide range of 
other factors which impact whether or not a borrower utilizes legal representation. In 
Illinois’ Eleventh Judicial Circuit Program in McLean County, borrowers are provided free 
legal representation without an eligibility screening.165 The University of Illinois College of 
Law Community Preservation Clinic provides representation in over 93% of the cases.166 
Whereas Illinois’ Sixth Judicial Circuit program in Champaign County provides borrowers 
access to free legal services through Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. 
(LOLAF), which has income and asset limitations as well as other restrictions such as 
citizenship.167 Under this program LOLAF typically does not provide representation to 
borrowers looking to relinquish the home. LOLAF provides similar assistance and 
eligibility screening in St. Clair County, Illinois, as shown in the figure above. In St. Clair 
County, LOLAF has provided representation to 26% of the homeowners facing 
foreclosure.168 The retention rates for borrowers represented by LOLAF are significantly 
higher than for borrowers who only work with housing counseling or neither housing 
counselors nor LOLAF.169 LOLAF’s prioritization of helping homeowners retain their 
housing may explain why there was a higher percentage of relinquishment agreements for 
borrowers working with a housing counselors. Also, having access to legal services seems 
                                                          
164  Id. at 177. “The difference in outcomes between those who received assistance and those who did not is not 
statistically significant. However, this is most likely due to the small sample size. When the outcomes from cases 
with housing counseling assistance and legal services assistance are combined, the difference does become 
statistically significant.” Id. 
165  The University of Illinois College of Law is bound by the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and the University 
conducts a thorough conflict of interest assessment before engaging in representation.  
166  Private counsel represents three percent and less than one percent are represented by Prairie State Legal Services. In 
two percent of cases the borrower chooses to represent themselves. These statistics are from the program launch on 
March 1, 2012 until July 2015. 
167  About Our Services, LAND LINCOLN LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUND., INCORPORATED, http://lollaf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/About-Our-Services.pdf (last visited May 10, 2016); see also Legal Services Corporation Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2996–2996l (2012). 
168  Shack, supra note 126, at 168. 
169  Id. at 177. 
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to significantly reduce the number of borrowers not completing the program. In McLean 
County, Illinois, where all borrowers have access to free legal representation, only 13% of 
borrowers represented by the Community Preservation Clinic, over a two-year period, 
withdrew from the program. Given the limited data set in this sample, further evaluation 
will be done to determine the significance of representation in borrower completion of the 
mediation process.  
Still, other borrowers retain their own private counsel. For example, in Illinois’ 
Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Kane County, 16% of homeowners were represented by private 
counsel, with only a little over 10% of those homeowners receiving free legal services.170 
However, the Kane County program, in contrast to the McLean County program, does not 
provide free representation to all borrowers. In this program, law students from Northern 
Illinois University College of Law staff a foreclosure desk and represent a few selected 
homeowners. Prairie State Legal Services, Inc. (PSLS), a legal services organization with 
eligibility criteria similar to LOLAF, has also represented a few homeowners in mediation.171 
The programs also vary in their structure, which makes it difficult to identify the 
impact of any particular factor. For example, income level of the borrowers has been found 
to directly impact the mediation outcomes, making it difficult to determine the impact of 
legal representation. “Personal economic factors were among the most statistically 
significant correlations with [Connecticut foreclosure mediation program outcomes in 
which] higher income statistically significantly tracked onto higher likelihood of home 
retention, loan modification, and a lower likelihood of being foreclosed on.”172 If borrowers 
have to be below low-income guidelines to receive legal assistance, the success rate for legal 
service cases may be decreased due to correlation between higher income and lower 
likelihood of foreclosures.  
Still, some rough comparisons can be made. The McLean County foreclosure 
mediation program rules are similar to those of the programs in Champaign County. One 
distinguishing characteristic between the two programs is the amount of available 
resources. The Illinois Attorney General funding has enabled the University of Illinois 
College of Law Community Preservation Clinic to provide free legal representation to 
borrowers participating in the McLean County Foreclosure Mediation program in the 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, regardless of borrower income. Under this program, 97% of 
borrowers have legal representation. Whereas in Champaign County, LOLAF provides 
representation based upon financial eligibility with priority given to borrowers wanting to 
remain in the home. LOLAF has provided representation to 38% of borrowers and 5% of 
those borrowers retained private counsel for a total of 43% of the borrowers having legal 
                                                          
170  Id. at 58. 
171  See Eligibility Factors, PRAIRIE STATE LEGAL SERV., http://pslegal.org/psls-apply-online.asp#eligible (last visited May 
10, 2016); see also Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996–2996l (2012). 
172  Gong & Brinton, supra note 133, at 28. 
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representation. Since each program has very similar rules with only slight variations 
differentiating them, a comparison of these programs may eventually provide a more 
accurate assessment but their recent implementation provides limited data for analysis. 
 
E. Housing Counseling 
Without the help of experienced housing counselors, homeowners acting alone fare 
much worse.173 A 2009 Counseling Program Evaluation revealed that homeowners are 1.6 
times more likely to cure foreclosure when they received counseling; borrowers with 
counseling received an increased loan modification payment reduction of $454 if they 
received counseling.174 It was also found that housing counseling increased the 
sustainability of modifications with 64% of counseled modifications remaining current 
compared to 51% of uncounseled modifications.175 
This may be in part because housing counselors are better able to explain the process 
and guide homeowners through the application process. A survey of borrowers conducted 
as part of the Illinois Attorney General funded foreclosure mediation programs found that 
70% of borrowers understood their options and how to work with their lenders much better 
after meeting one-on-one with a housing counselor, as compared to borrowers only gaining 
a somewhat better understanding when the pre-mediation sessions were facilitated by a 
mediator and included the lender attorney.176 As shown in the figure above, the Illinois 
Twentieth Circuit shows a difference between outcomes for those who went to housing 
counseling and those who did not.177 In Illinois’ Sixteenth Circuit, there was a difference in 
outcomes, but this could be because “about 30% of homeowners who did not receive 
housing counseling were represented by private attorneys, while homeowners receiving 
housing counseling were unrepresented. Further, few homeowners who were looking to 
relinquish their homes sought housing counseling.”178  
In addition to providing counseling, the HUD-certified counselors can streamline 
the application submission process by utilizing a loss mitigation web portal accessed by 
loan servicers. This secure electronic interface enables the parties to communicate more 
effectively and efficiently by clearly delineating servicer required documentation, 
acknowledging that submissions have been received, and utilizing dynamic 
                                                          
173  See Walsh, supra note 28, at 22. 
174  Neil Mayer, Peter A. Tatian, Kenneth Temkin, & Charles A. Calhoun, National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling 
Program Evaluation: Preliminary Analysis of Program Effects, URB. INST. vii–ii, 38, 41 (Nov. 2009), http://www.urban. 
 org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411982-National-Foreclosure-Mitigation-Counseling-Program-Eval 
 uation-Preliminary-Analysis-of-Program-Effects.PDF. 
175  Melanca Clark & Daniel Olmos, Foreclosure Mediation: Emerging Research and Evaluation Practices, U.S. DEP’T 
JUSTICE 30 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atj/legacy/2012/01/05/foreclosure-mediation.pdf.  
176  See Shack, supra note 126, at 31. 
177  Id. at 177. 
178  Id. at 67. 
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communications through messaging and notifications. The paperwork requirements for 
each servicer and type of loan can vary. The portal can generate a customized list of forms 
and documents required by each servicer. However, in Kane County, Illinois, packets were 
initially being submitted by housing counselors via the Hope LoanPort, but the servicers 
were not giving the information to their attorney or even making them aware that the 
packets had been received.179 In order to address this problem, housing counselors now 
submit packets to both the servicer and the Plaintiff’s representation.180 
 
F. Foreclosure Mediations Oversight Mechanisms 
 Mediation provides a structure to manage chaos and resolve disputes. Most 
mediation programs require good-faith participation, which helps to address the inherent 
oversight problems of the loan modification process. By requiring good faith, the courts 
can enforce the program rules and further the purpose of the foreclosure mediation 
programs. A New York court recently ruled “[t]he court has an affirmative obligation to 
ensure that the primary statutory goal of keeping homeowners in their homes, and the 
concomitant obligation of ensuring that the parties act in good faith, are met.”181 In fact, 
when New York enacted the Mandatory Settlement Conference in residential foreclosure 
actions, good faith was not an enumerated requirement. However in 2009 the state 
legislature amended the act to expressly require good-faith negotiation. As stated in a 
subsequent court decision, “[a]s the mortgage crisis has worsened . . . it has become evident 
that more must be accomplished to protect New Yorkers in these difficult times and 
beyond.”182 
 Courts in a number of states183 have sanctioned servicers for their bad faith in 
foreclosure mediation programs, such as not appearing with an authorized representative 
who could make decisions on loss mitigation questions, unduly delaying application 
decisions, or failing to give reasonable explanations for their decisions.184 “Sanctions have 
included monetary penalties, orders for servicers to bring in a qualified representative to 
negotiate, orders tolling accrual of interest and fees during periods of delay, and orders to 
modify a loan.”185 Some courts have gone as far as prohibiting a foreclosure sale or 
dismissing a judicial foreclosure case with prejudice, thus preventing the servicer from re-
                                                          
179  See id. at 55. 
180  See id. 
181  Deutsche Bank Nat’l. Trust Co. v. Husband, 13 N.Y.S.3d 849 (Sup. Ct. 2015). 
182  Wells Fargo Bank v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608 (Sup. 2010) (citing Sponsor's Memorandum, Assemb. 8917A, 
232nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. Assembly Mem. in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2009, ch 507; Senate Introducer Mem. in 
Support of L 2009, ch 507, 2009 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 1839). 
183  Including Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Nevada, New York, Ohio, and Vermont. 
184  See Walsh, supra note 28, at 7. 
185  Id.  
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filing the claim.186 One example of this is in Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v. Bartlett in which 
the Maine Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the case with prejudice, as 
it was ‘“the only appropriate sanction’ in light of Bayview’s ‘pattern of disruptive behavior,’ 
its failure to respond to lesser sanctions, and the court’s ‘strong warning’ that future 
noncompliance could result in dismissal with prejudice.”187 
 
G. Insufficient Documentation 
 Both the Government Accountability Office and housing counselors cite lost 
documents, requests for unnecessary paperwork, and repeated requests to replace lost 
documents, sometimes up to six times, as a possible reasons for HAMP denials.188 
Foreclosure mediation programs work to address this issue in a wide variety of ways, 
including mediation status sessions to facilitate the document exchange, requiring the 
servicer to file a checklist, or setting deadlines for the document exchange under the 
program rules.   
 For example, in Kane County, Illinois, the program coordinator and a survey of 
mediation reports showed that lenders often lost loss-mitigation applications, which 
lengthened the review stage. Realizing this was an issue, the program adapted by requiring 
lenders’ attorneys to be more accountable in their reporting. This resulted in more timely 
responses and readiness to mediate sooner.189 
 Mediation programs also collect information and provide benchmarks. Under the 
Illinois Sixth Circuit and McLean County Foreclosure Mediation Programs, there are set 
deadlines by which the plaintiffs are required to respond to initial loss mitigation 
applications. Both programs allow the plaintiff fourteen days to respond, which is far more 
generous than the five-day requirement under the CFPB regulations. Still, servicers 
routinely miss these deadlines. In Connecticut, the research found “plaintiffs (or their 
attorneys) were more likely to be unprepared, to file a continuance, to engage in conduct 
inconsistent with the objectives of the mediation program, not to possess the ability to 
mediate, or not to make an appearance.”190 When these instances happen, the borrower 
can bring such issues to the court’s attention and seek sanctions. The court then acts as 
monitor of these issues and holds the servicers accountable.  
                                                          
186  See id. at 7; see also, e.g., id. at 30. 
187  87 A.3d 741, 745 (Me. 2014). 
188  See Walsh, supra note 28, at 17 (citing The Chasm Between Words and Deeds VI: HAMP Is Not Working, CAL. 
REINVESTMENT COALITION, (July 2010), http://www.calreinvest.org/system/resources/W1siZiIsIjIwM 
TEvMDQvMTgvMTdfNTRfNDRfODM0X0hhbXBfaXNfbm90X3dvcmtpbmcucGRmIl1d/Hamp_is_not_working.pdf; 
Olga Pierce & Paul Kiel, Loan Mod Program Left Homeowners’ Fate in Hands of Dysfunctional Industry, PRO PUBLICA 
(2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/loan-mod-program-left-homeowners-fate-in-hands-of-dysfunctional-
industry. 
189  See Shack, supra note 126, at 55. 
190  Gong & Brinton, supra note 133, at 30. 
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Where a plaintiff fails to expeditiously review submitted financial information, sends 
inconsistent and contradictory communications, and denies requests for a loan modification 
without adequate grounds, or, conversely, where a defendant fails to provide requested 
financial information or provides incomplete or misleading financial information, such 
conduct could constitute the failure to negotiate in good faith.191 
  
 In one court’s decision, the judge outlined his own perceptions of the servicer’s 
activities, which were taken into consideration in ordering sanctions against the servicer.  
 
The court notes that on numerous occasions during the settlement conferences, 
homeowners have, among other ways, faxed, emailed, mailed by certified mail, return[ed] 
receipt request[s], mailed in envelopes provided by the bank, mailed by federal express or 
overnight delivery, modification applications, financial documents, updated pay stubs and 
bank statement[s], which the banks invariably claim they never received despite 
contradictory proof that the documents were sent and even received . . . . [T]he banks have 
consistently refused to accept proof of delivery and receipt, making homeowner[s] re-send 
the documents, in many instances on multiple occasions, the court finds it interesting that 
plaintiff’s counsel requests that the court excuse its default in appearance by accepting 
counsel’s bald assertion, in the face of overwhelming support to the contrary, that the order 
was not received.192 
 
H. Denials Based Upon the NPV Calculation 
 To address the issue of denials based upon the NPV calculations, some foreclosure 
mediation programs require servicers to provide NPV-related information prior to the 
scheduled mediation date. For example, the McLean County, Illinois program requires 
servicers to complete a Plaintiff’s Questionnaire within thirty days of scheduling the 
mediation, and the questionnaire requests the NPV inputs.193 This way the borrower can 
run their own NPV calculations using the online calculator and can dispute any of the 
inputs in the mediation. 
 If the parties are unable to resolve the matter in mediation, the decision can then 
be administratively appealed or brought to the court’s attention. In BAC Home Loan 
Servicing v. Westervelt, a New York court found “the Bank [had] not acted in good faith in 
negotiating a settlement with this homeowner. Indeed, the homeowner's representation 
that plaintiff inexplicably refused to re-examine her income—which the bank must do 
under HAMP directives—stands uncontradicted.”194 The court then barred the collection 
of any arrears, including interest, costs, and fees, during the time in which the servicer had 
acted in bad faith as part of the mediation process.195 In enforcing mediation, the courts 
                                                          
191  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Sarmiento, 121 A.D.3d 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). 
192  BAC Home Loan Servicing v. Westervelt, 920 N.Y.S.2d 239 ( Sup. 2010). 
193  See Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Mandatory Mediation Program Rules “Exhibit D” MCLEAN COUNTY CIR. CT., 
http://www.mcleancountyil.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1691 (last updated Oct. 9, 2012) (providing a copy of the 
program rules and Plaintiff’s Questionnaire).   
194  920 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. 2010). 
195  Id.  
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have used the HAMP provisions as a benchmark of good-faith negotiations, enabling the 
banks to abide by both state and federal regulations.196 “Conduct such as providing 
conflicting information, refusal to honor agreements, unexcused delay, unexplained 
charges, and misrepresentations have been held to constitute ‘bad faith.’”197 In determining 
the remedy for violation of the good-faith negotiation requirements, the courts cannot 
rewrite the contract at issue or impose contractual terms, but they can cancel certain 
interest.198  
 
I. Failure to Accept a Loan Modification Offer 
 As outlined above, housing counselors have long believed servicers have purposely 
pushed borrowers into less favorable loan modifications rather than offering them a HAMP 
modification. The Permanent Loan Modification chart above also shows a significant 
number of private modifications over HAMP. Recently, a New York court identified this 
practice of servicers purposely pushing borrowers into less favorable loan modifications 
and sanctioned the servicer for the behaviors: 
 
The court has concluded that the appropriate sanction to impose herein is to reduce the 
interest rate to 2% on the balance which has accrued subsequent to August 1, 2010, the date 
that plaintiff should have approved defendant’s HAMP application, instead of delaying until 
December 11, 2011 and then offering him an in-house modification which verged upon the 
unconscionable and which was designed to be rejected. The court has thus determined that 
had the modification been completed timely, the interest rate after August 1, 2010 would 
have been 2% and the large sum which has accrued at 6.275% was directly caused by 
plaintiff’s bad faith and that plaintiff should not be rewarded for their delays, which went on 
for almost five more years.199 
 
 In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, a New York court became so frustrated with 
the servicer’s attempts to funnel the borrowers into an unaffordable loan modification that 
the court dismissed the case finding: 
 
The terms of the proposed modification agreement, particularly but not exclusively the 
inclusion of an adjustable rate component, are unacceptable to this court. The proposed 
modification agreement flies in the face of the . . . legislation . . . which was designed to assist 
                                                          
196  Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Walker, 946 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 
197  Id. at 854 n.6; see also One W. Bank, FSB v. Greenhut, 957 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (finding no violation of duty 
of good faith on behalf of the plaintiff where there were no misrepresentations, delays, unexplained charged, or 
conflicting information and a residency requirement argument was put forth by the plaintiff in good faith); Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ruggiero, 972 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (citing plaintiff's lack of good faith, unexcused delay, 
unexplained charges, and misrepresentations, as evidence plaintiff’s of lack of good faith). 
198  See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Sarmiento, 121 A.d.3d 187, 207-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (upholding sanctions imposed on 
the plaintiff, which barred the plaintiff’s interest that accrued on the loan, because of lack of “good faith” during 
negotiations with the defendant); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Williams, 121 A.d.3d 1098, 1102-03 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2014) (holding that U.S. Bank was not entitled to collect accrued interest due to lack of good faith negotiations with 
the defendant). 
199  Deutsche Bank Nat’l. Trust Co. v. Husband, 13 N.Y.S.3d 849 (Sup. 2015). 
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borrowers in foreclosure cases to remain in their homes and to prevent a foreclosure crisis 
like the one currently gripping this state and the nation from reoccurring in the future.200 
 
J. Racial Disparity in Mediation Programs 
 In looking at four of the circuits in Illinois funded by the Attorney General grant and 
in the Connecticut Foreclosure Mediation Program, the racial and ethnic demographics 
broadly reflect the makeup of the communities in which they serve.201 Although, in Illinois’ 
Seventeenth Circuit in the Winnegabo County, Boone County, and St. Clair County 
programs, “non-Hispanic Whites were slightly underrepresented and Latinos and 
Black/African-Americans were over-represented.”202 In McLean County, Illinois 9.8% of 
African Americans participate in the program in comparison to the county’s African 
American population of 7.7%.203 Similarly in Connecticut, “[African American] 
homeowners are overrepresented and white homeowners are underrepresented relative to 
the general population.”204 As noted before, there is no reliable data on the race or ethnicity 
of homeowners in foreclosure, so it cannot be determined if mediation program 
participants are reflective of the larger population.  
 “Interestingly, in [three out of the four Illinois Attorney General funded programs], 
the ratio of minority homeowners increased as the cases moved through the programs. 
That is, Black/African-Americans and Latinos made up a greater proportion of 
homeowners who entered the programs than who contacted them and made up a greater 
proportion of homeowners who completed the programs than entered them.”205 The other 
remaining program showed that “fewer Latinos who made first contact with the program 
completed the steps to participate,” which may be a reflection of the language barriers.206 
 In an evaluation of the Connecticut foreclosure mediation program, “controlling for 
all observed factors, such as personal economic factors and loan characteristics, there were 
also no statistically significant racial/ethnic differences, except that minority status was 
statistically significantly correlated with a 7.76% increase in likelihood of loan 
modification.”207 
 
  
                                                          
200  Wells Fargo Bank v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 634 (Sup. Ct. 2010) 
201  See Gong & Brinton, supra note 133, at 33; Shack, supra note 126, at 34. 
202  Shack, supra note 126, at 34. 
203  Quick Facts: McLean County, Illinois, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/17113.html. 
(last updated Oct. 14, 2013) (providing the 2010 census results for McLean County, Illinois). The percentage 
participating in the McLean County, Illinois program is the percentage of cases in which race was reported. In 100 
cases, no race information was captured. 
204  Gong & Brinton, supra note 133, at 33. 
205  Shack, supra note 126, at 34. 
206  Id. 
207  Gong & Brinton, supra note 133, at 28. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Though foreclosure mediation programs are still in their infancy, the program 
structures are designed to address the loss-mitigation policy failings and may provide a 
remedy. These programs can also closely monitor servicers and their adherence to 
established loss-mitigation policies. Most importantly these programs can work to level the 
playing field for minority borrowers by giving them equal access to assistance, as well as 
tracking loss mitigation outcomes for any disparate impact. 
 
